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Negotiating National Identity in Taiwan: Between 
Nativisation and De-Sinicisation 
 
 
Christopher R. Hughes 
 
 
Since the Chen Shui-bian administration came to power in May 2000, the charge that 
the state has been consolidating Taiwan’s separation from China by systematically 
purging the island of Chinese influences through a process of ‘de-sinicisation’ (qu 
zhongguo hua) has increasingly been made on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. It will 
be argued below that this is an over-simplification of the unavoidable challenge of 
replacing the KMT’s version of Chinese nationalism with a more participatory vision 
of politics. At the centre of this is a discussion of the nature of ‘nativisation’ (bentu 
hua) that has been integral to Taiwan’s democratisation that goes back much further 
than the Chen administration.   
 
It is quite appropriate to take the critical view of identity politics in Taiwan that is 
presented by Chao, Lee and Chiang in this volume. History is replete with examples 
of nativist movements being appropriated to legitimise militarist, ultra-nationalist and 
fascist regimes. One need look no further than the Chinese and Japanese forms of 
nationalism that were imposed on Taiwan in the past to find such cases. Focusing on 
the concept of ‘civic culture’ is also certainly useful for explaining why excluding 
segments of the population from political life due to ethnic loyalties or characteristics 
is essentially un-democratic. Almond and Verba thus provide one of the most 
convincing explanations for how even a state that practices universal suffrage and has 
institutions such as political parties and an effective legislature can be totalitarian if its 
values are not drawn from a participatory civic culture.1  
 
Yet if the civic culture model is applied to Taiwan, it can just as easily be argued that 
democratic erosion had not occurred precisely because the need to increase political 
participation has been a dominant theme in the discussion of the relationship between 
identity and the state. This is because democratisation has entailed unravelling the 
way in which the politics of Chinese nationalism reduces citizens to the passive status 
of what Almond and Verba would call ‘participant subjects’. In Taiwan this took the 
particular form of excluding the majority of citizens from political life by suspending 
democracy until the Chinese nation was united and nation-wide elections could be 
held. In terms drawn from nationalist theory, the process of recognising that 
sovereignty is practiced by the residents of Taiwan could thus be described as an 
attempt to replace Chinese ‘ethnic’ nationalism with a form of ‘civic’ nationalism. 
Whereas the former emphasises that the nation is a community of birth with a native 
culture, the latter is a territorial and legalistic concept that stresses the existence of an 
historic territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality of members, and 
common civic culture and ideology.2  
 
                                                 
1 Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 8. 
2 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 11. 
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The argument over de-sinicisation 
The accusation that a process of ‘de-sinicisation’ is occurring in Taiwan has arisen in 
the context of a general re-orientation of identity that has been supported and shaped 
by state policies under the Chen Shui-bian administration. As pointed out by Chao, 
Lee and Chiang in this volume, this involves initiatives to rectify Taiwan’s name, 
changes to institutions designed to promote unification with mainland China and 
attempts to change the ROC Constitution.  
 
Sometimes this has been highly visible, as with the removal of the placards in front of 
the Presidential Palace that advocated the unification of China under the Three 
Principles of the People and the departure of slogans urging a renaissance of Chinese 
culture and opposition to Taiwanese independence from military bases. The 
Government Information Office (GIO) has taken an active part in changing public 
symbols, such as the addition of ‘Taiwan’ and a map of the island to the front cover of 
the English version of the 2001 ROC Yearbook and the relocation of the map of China 
to the back. These modest steps have now developed into a more positive presentation 
of Taiwan itself. The 2006-7 edition of the yearbook features the five winning 
symbols of an on-line poll called ‘Show Taiwan to the World’, which asked netizens 
to select which images they think best symbolize their ‘country’. These are the Taipei 
101 skyscraper (the world's tallest building),  Jade Mountain (the highest peak in Asia 
east of the Himalayas), the folk art of glove puppetry,  Taiwanese cuisine and the 
endangered Formosan landlocked salmon.3 
 
The ‘movement to rectify Taiwan’s name’ (Taiwan zheng ming yundong) has 
involved dropping references to ‘China’ and the ROC when referring to the state and 
its various organisations. Chao, Lee and Chiang note examples such as the renaming 
of Chiang Kai-shek airport as Taiwan International Airport in 2006 and renewed 
efforts as of early 2007 to make state-owned enterprises such as China Petroleum Co, 
China Post Ltd and China Ship Building change their names. Name rectification is 
particularly sensitive, however, when it directly impacts on foreign relations,, such as 
when Chen Shui-bian announced to a meeting of the Formosan Association for Public 
Affairs (FAPA) early in 2002 that a new ROC passport was to be produced with the 
name ‘Taiwan’ added and listed as the place of issue.4  The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs has extended this attempt to re-orientate identity to foreign policy by pressing 
for ‘Taiwan’ to be used in the names of its overseas missions. The launching of a 
campaign for membership of the United Nations under the name ‘Taiwan’ in 2007 
and attempts to make this the topic for a referendum in tandem with the March 2008 
Presidential election has brought the issue of name rectification to a new head.  
 
Among the transformation of institutions, the abolition of the National Unification 
Council (NUC) has drawn most attention due to its direct impact on cross-Strait 
relations. Concerns have also grown over the way in which the re-orientation of 
identity is taking place in more subtle ways, especially through changes of personnel 
in key cultural institutions such as the National History Institute (guo shi guan) and 
the National Palace Museum. Prof Zhang Yanxian was appointed to head the former, 
                                                 
3 Taiwan Yearbook 2006-7 online at: http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/cover.html. 
Consulted 10 June 2007. 
4 The new passport began to be issued in September 2003. 
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a native of Chiayi County with a PhD from Tokyo University. He is an expert on the 
relationship between the Han and aboriginal groups in Taiwan, social movements 
during the Japanese occupation and after, the 228 Incident and political cases from the 
1950s.5 Under his leadership, the Institute has produced books under titles such as 
From Martial Law to Lifting Martial Law (Cong ‘jieyan’ dao ‘jie yan’) and the 
biographies of prominent Dang Wai and DPP figures.  
 
The appointment of Professor Tu Cheng-sheng (Du Zhengsheng), an LSE alumnus as 
head of the National Palace Museum in May 2000, has been even more controversial. 
Tu had in fact been singled out as one of the chief architects of ‘de-sinification’ well 
before the Chen administration came to power because he had been influential in 
steering a re-orientation of the school curriculum and teaching materials to learning 
more about Taiwan and less about China in the late 1990s.6 Having stewardship over 
the museum that was once used by the KMT as a kind of cultural umbilical chord 
linking Taiwan to China’s grand tradition, Tu incurred the wrath of many critics when 
he proceeded to label the Chinese artefacts as ‘Chinese’ and established a gallery 
devoted to Taiwanese culture.  
 
The reorientation of education that Tu had begun under Lee Teng-hui also continued 
under the Chen administration. Already in March 2001 the Ministry of Education had 
produced a policy on ‘Nativisation of Education’ (bentu hua jiaoyu), according to 
which junior and middle school pupils have to select to learn a ‘native language’ 
(xiangtu yuyan) from Hokkien, Hakka and an aboriginal language. The controversial 
Know Taiwan (renshi Taiwan) textbooks became teaching material for history, 
geography and social studies from the academic year beginning in August. A Native 
Education Committee (bentu jiaoyu weiyuan hui) began to revise the Know Taiwan 
curriculum in 2002 and the following year published a draft outline for a new high 
school history curriculum in which Chinese history since the mid-Ming Dynasty 
became part of ‘World History’. An increasing emphasis on native culture can also be 
seen in the way that the Ministry of Education has actively promoted and funded the 
establishment of departments of Taiwan Literature in national universities since 2000. 
When Tu Cheng-sheng was appointed Minister of Education at the start of Chen’s 
second term in May 2004, accusations of ‘de-sinification’ reached a new height of 
intensity. 
 
This re-orientation of education has not been confined to schools and universities, 
moreover. The military has also moved away from its old practice of inculcating its 
staff and recruits with anti-independence indoctrination. Civil service examinations 
have been changed too, with the ‘Chinese History’ paper now combined with 
‘Theories of Historical Methodology’, while ‘History of the Chinese System’ has 
been replaced by ‘Modern Taiwanese History’. There has even been the addition of a 
paper on ‘Japanese Modern History’. The Examination Yuan decided that 
examinations for promotion on ‘National Literature’ (guo wen) and the ROC 
Constitution should be abolished. National examinations on National General 
Knowledge (guojia chang shi)  were also scrapped. 
                                                 
5 Online at National History Institute (Guoshi guan) website: 
http://www.drnh.gov.tw/www/page/A/page-A.aspx. Consulted 10 June 2007. 
6 On national identity and the education reforms of the Lee Teng-hui era see Hughes, C. and Stone, R.  
'Nationalism and Curriculum Reform in Hong Kong and Taiwan', China Quarterly, No 160, Dec 1999, 
pp. 977-91. 
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Even foreigners have not been spared from identity politics, as can be seen in the 
argument over what system of Romanisation system should be used for Chinese 
characters. In July 1999 a decision had been made to adopt the Pinyin system used in 
mainland China and recognised by the United Nations. In September 2000 this was 
overturned by the Ministry of Education’s Committee for Promoting the National 
Language (jiaoyu bu guoyu tuixing weiyuanhui) which revived the idea of adopting a 
new form of Romanisation called ‘Tongyong Pinyin’ that would more accurately 
reflect the way that Chinese is pronounced in Taiwan. 7  Unfortunately, as some 
foreign critics of this policy were the first to point out, very few people know how to 
use this special Taiwanese system.  
 
These steps affecting Taiwan’s identity are bound to be at the centre of political 
controversy because they are supported by those who wish to see Taiwan consolidate 
its political independence from China on the one side, while they are treated with 
mixture of anger and disdain by those who believe that the island is a part of China on 
the other. They have been made more controversial, however, because they were 
taken at the same time that Chen Shui-bian was taking measures affecting cross-Strait 
relations. Most notable among these has been the launching of Chen’s doctrine of the 
formula of ‘one country on each side’ (yi bian yi guo) of the Strait in August 2001 and 
the passing of a referendum law in time to hold the island’s first ever referendum in 
conjunction with the 2004 presidential election.  
 
Such initiatives have been condemned by observers in Taiwan, mainland China and 
even the United States as symptomatic of a movement towards achieving Taiwanese 
independence and upsetting the ‘status quo’ across the Taiwan Strait. As a result, 
there has been a tendency to conflate charges of ‘de-sinicisation’ and ‘nativisation’ in 
a general barrage of criticism against Chen Shui-bian’s ‘secessionist policies’.8 This, 
however, obscures the way in which the argument over ‘de-sinicisation’ is one 
manifestation of the complex attempt to negotiate Taiwan’s identity within the 
constraints of domestic politics and international relations that has been part of 
Taiwan’s democratisation for many decades. To unravel this it is necessary to look at 
how ‘de-sinicisation’ is related to the longer-term discourse on ‘nativisation’. 
 
The consensus on nativisation 
The attempt to develop a participatory civic culture based on nativisation in Taiwan 
has a long history, going back at least as far as the rejection of KMT authoritarianism 
by dissidents who formed the opposition ‘Dang Wai’ movement under martial law.9 
Leading figures in this movement explicitly rejected the KMT’s Chinese nationalism 
with a form of ethnic Taiwanese nationalism because this would be destabilising in a 
fragmented society like Taiwan’s. If the state was to be based on homogeneous ethnic 
identity, they could ask, what would become of the many individuals who did not fit 
                                                 
7 This system was largely devised by Dr. B.C. Yu (Yu Boquan) of the Academia Sinica and approved 
in 1996 by the Educational Reform Council (jiaoyu gaige weiyuanhui) led by the Nobel laureate Dr. 
Lee Yuan-tseh (Le Yuanzhe) , then head of the Academia Sinica. 
8 Taiwan Affairs Office, Zhongguo Taiwan wenti waishi renyuan duben (Reader on China’s Taiwan 
Problem for Non-Specialist Personnel), (Beijjing: jiuzhou chubanshe, 2006) pp. 138-47.  
9 A more extensive account of the emergence of thinking about identity from the Dang Wai to the 
KMT can be found in Christopher Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and 
Status in International Society (London and New York: Routledge, 1997).   
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in, such as the unfortunate Manchurian who was labelled a ‘Han traitor’ in mainland 
China because he had worked for the Japanese, fled to Japan where he was called by a 
derogatory epithet for ‘Chinese’, moved to Shanghai where he was called a 
‘Manchurian’, then eventually settled in Taiwan where he was called a 
‘Mainlander’?10  
 
The way in which this concern to develop an inclusive political culture led to the 
articulation of a kind of civic nationalism can be seen quite clearly in the work of the 
leading theorist of the independence movement in exile, Professor Peng Ming-min. 
Peng was most influenced by Ernest Renan's view that ‘neither race, language, nor 
culture form a nation but rather a deeply felt sense of community and shared destiny’ 
(mingyun gongtongti). His determination to break the link between ethnicity and the 
state is clear to see when he argues that the Chinese should learn: 
 
... to distinguish clearly between ethnic origin, culture and language on the one 
hand, and politics and law on the other, and to abandon the idea that those who 
are ethnically, culturally, and linguistically Chinese must be politically and 
legally Chinese as well.11  
 
Advocating this contractarian view of state and society was a much more effective 
way of undermining the ethnic nationalism of the KMT than advocating an exclusive 
ethnic Taiwanese nationalism. It enabled Peng to refer positively to examples from 
history, such as the Anglo-Saxon nations, where people of a similar background and 
heritage had established separate political entities and, conversely, cases where people 
of different origin and background constituted a single state. 12  
 
This vision of national identity was eventually appropriated by the KMT as it sought 
to find a more democratic foundation for its own legitimacy. The primary reason was 
the erosion of the party’s Chinese nationalist ideology by the crises that rocked 
Taiwan in the 1970s. These include the failure of the KMT to assert Chinese 
sovereignty when the Diaoyu/Senakaku Islands in the East China Sea were transferred 
to Japan by the United States, the departure of the ROC from the United Nations, the 
death of Chiang Kai-shek and the growing international isolation that culminated with 
the breaking of diplomatic relations with Washington on 1 January 1979. The 
acceleration and deepening of nativisation that took place in the decades that followed, 
however, was shaped primarily by the domestic dynamics of political liberalisation.  
 
When Lee Teng-hui became the first Taiwan-born president and chairman of the 
KMT in 1988 he presided over a party and a state that were already undergoing a 
process of nativisation in terms of the ethnic composition of its personnel, thanks to 
reforms introduced by his predecessor, Chiang Ching-kuo. By the mid-1980s more 
than 70 percent of the KMT’s members were ‘native’ Taiwanese, as in being born in 
Taiwan before the armed forces of the ROC took the Japanese surrender in 1945 or 
being the descendants of such people.13 As this nativisation met increasing resistance 
                                                 
10 Liu Feng-sung (Liu Fengsong), Formosa, 1979 No. 3, p. 76. 
11 A Taste of Freedom, (New York, Chicago, San Francisco, 1972), p. 244. 
12 A Taste of Freedom, (New York, Chicago, San Francisco, 1972), p. 239. 
 
13 Lucien Pye, ‘Taiwan’s Political Development and Its Implications for Beijing’, Asian Survey, June 
1986, pp. 618-9. 
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under Lee from a ruling elite that was dominated by those who had come from 
mainland China after 1945, he consolidated his power base by looking for support 
outside the party. In doing this he could appropriate the idea that Taiwan was a 
‘community of shared destiny’ that had already become part of common political 
discourse thanks to the activities of the Dang Wai and the recently established DPP. 
He could also develop a more inclusive vision of politics as a way to address concern 
among academics that a Taiwanese ultra-nationalism might emerge if people were not 
clear about the difference between ethnic and civic nationalism. 
 
Above all, Lee was also aware that identification with Taiwan was unavoidable if the 
KMT was to survive as a popular party in a democratic system. As he put it himself in 
1994: 
 
 Anybody facing the enthusiastic competition of party politics in 
Taiwan, if they cannot sincerely identify with Taiwan as the paramount 
objective, definitely cannot survive. Moreover, there are priorities 
[literally, things have roots and ends, prior and latter], the reasoning is 
plain to see. If you go beyond identifying with Taiwan, and just strive 
to identify with something at an even higher level, the result must 
definitely be the loss of both.14 
 
By moving in the direction of ‘nativisation’, Lee was responding not only to politics 
at the elite level but also the burgeoning demands of a stronger civil society. A good 
example of this is the way that the increasingly controversial education reforms that 
emerged during his administration grew out of a movement that originated in calls by 
students for campus democracy and autonomy that appeared at National Taiwan 
University as early as 1982. Other groups began to push for a more pluralistic school 
education, to be achieved through autonomous teacher and parent associations and the 
private production of text books. As political liberalisation proceeded, links were 
created between educational pressure groups and broader elements of civil society, 
such as welfare groups and human rights organisations, in the context of a 
deteriorating social situation characterised by a rise in youth crime, suicides and drug 
abuse.15  
 
Additional space and support for this kind of movement was provided as the DPP 
took control of local governments. In September 1989, for example, Ilan County 
decided to stop schools from holding daily flag-raising ceremonies and hanging 
portraits other than those of the National Father in classrooms. On 8 January the 
following year, a number of DPP local authorities announced their intention to 
practise bi-lingual teaching.16  Pressure groups began to gain more access to the 
central-government policy-making process too after elections were held for the 
National Assembly in 1991 and the Legislative Yuan in 1992. The alliance of welfare 
and human rights organisations reached a peak in 1994 with a wave of protests 
involving some 210 pressure groups. Demands made by this movement for pluralism, 
teaching about Taiwan itself, taking ideology out of education and even instilling a 
                                                 
14 Zhongguo shibao  (China Times), 31 December 1994. 
15 Pi Hsiao-hua (Bi Xiaohua) Taiwan minjian jiaoyu gaige yundong: guojia yu shehui de fenxi, 
(Taiwan’s Civil Movement for Education Reform: Analysis of State and Society), (Taipei, Qianwei 
chubanshe, 1996), pp. 128-98. 
16 Pi, p. 377. 
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sense of Taiwan consciousness in the young17 received parliamentary support from 
both the DPP and elements of an increasingly ‘nativised’ KMT.  
 
As the reform movement expanded it became increasingly difficult to divorce 
problems of academic autonomy and the mental and physical health of children from 
the ideological use of education, especially in courses such as the Three Principles of 
the People and the Thought of Sun Yatsen, and in the standardisation of textbooks. 
Other groups were more outspoken on the issue of nationalism, accusing the KMT of 
using education to ‘brainwash’ the residents of Taiwan in the ideology of Chinese 
unification, dissipating their identification with Taiwan and making them not dare to 
recognise that Taiwan is an independent sovereign state. Some teachers’ groups even 
began educational work to promote an independent Taiwan and a strong sense of 
Taiwanese history and culture .18 
 
Balancing domestic and external constraints 
In responding to such pressures for nativisation, however, Lee Teng-hui always had to 
keep one eye on the management of cross-Strait relations. Beijing’s unchanging 
interpretation of China was reiterated in its 1993 white paper on The Taiwan Question 
and Reunification of China,19 which merely stated that ‘There is only one China in the 
world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and the seat of China's central 
government is in Beijing’. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council tried to find a way to  
satisfy the growing domestic demands for change while not provoking Beijing by 
asserting that while Taiwan and the mainland could both be described as ‘Chinese’ 
territory, ‘It is an undeniable fact that the two have been divided and ruled separately 
since 1949’.20 Its description of China as an entity with ‘multifaceted geographical, 
political, historical, and cultural meanings’,21 was an obvious attempt to break the 
relationship between ethnic identity and the state.  
 
While this was not appreciated by Beijing, it is easy to overlook the way in which Lee 
Teng-hui tried to use Taiwan’s ‘special’ relationship with a de-politicised vision of 
Chinese identity in a positive way. When, in December 1991, he stated that, ‘We 
cannot break our relations with the rest of the Chinese people, nor can we cut our 
links with Chinese culture’,22 he was reminding the people of Taiwan that it would 
not be in their interests to develop an exclusive sense of their own identity that might 
alienate the island from the benefits that could be accrued from tapping into the 
Chinese political and cultural world. In this respect, one could be both Taiwanese and 
Chinese, as Lee explained:   
 
 Identify with Taiwan, cherish Taiwan, struggle hard for Taiwan, that is 
a Taiwanese; do not give up the hard work and hope of unifying the 
country and reviving the nation (minzu), that is Chinese . . . . This view 
of identity, is the understanding that “with survival is hope, only with 
                                                 
17 Pi, pp. 268-9. 
18 Pi, pp. 183-90. 
19The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China, (Beijing, Taiwan Affairs Office and Information 
Office State Council, 1993). 
20 There is no ‘Taiwan Question’ There is Only a ‘China Question’, (Taipei, Mainland Affairs Council, 
1993), p. 4. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Lee Teng-hui, ‘Love and Faith’, Creating the Future, p. 133. 
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survival is there development”. Only by advocating this view of 
identity can the nationalism of the Three Principles of the People serve 
the new significance of the age.23 
 
Lee was also aware of the immense economic and political capital that could be 
tapped into by maintaining good relations with the Chinese overseas. While his 
constitutional reforms disenfranchised these communities, they still maintained the 
appearance of representation in the ROC's parliamentary chambers through the 
allocating of a small number of seats filled according to the proportion of votes won 
by parties in elections held in Taiwan. As with relations with the people of the 
Chinese mainland, political disenfranchisement was not meant to preclude the 
cultivation of special economic, social and cultural links.  
 
Finally, Lee also had to develop a mode of nativisation that was compatible with a 
vision of the post-Cold War international order that posed a challenge to Beijing’s 
hard version of state sovereignty. It is within this context that we find the idea of 
Taiwan’s identity being articulated in ways that make it compatible with the vision of 
a ‘global village’ established on respecting democracy and human rights, replacing 
the use of military force with negotiation, promoting a mixed market economy and 
strengthening collective security. 24 Of course this international vision offers more 
room for Taiwan to carve out a new identity and status for itself because recognition 
is based not on the congruence of nation and state, but on the moral criteria of 
democratic and economic achievements. Rather than resist what Sun Yat-sen and Mao 
Zedong would have considered to be the imperialist forces of the global economy, 
Taiwan had everything to gain by diving in head first, joining NAFTA, working with 
multinationals and entering the GATT/WTO, becoming a hub for international air 
transportation and establishing itself as a major Asian financial centre.25 
 
It is within these domestic and external constraints that developing an inclusive, civic 
form of nationalist identity was useful for Lee. It would have been far too 
controversial for him to use the exiled Peng Ming-min’s vocabulary of the 
‘community of shared destiny’. As early as August 1991, however, he could tell a 
group of university professors that there was a need for ‘grafting the concept of 
“Gemeinschaft” (shengming gongtong ti) onto the traditional family ethic and 
morality’.26While he traced this concept to Goethe and Kant, it shares the 
fundamental proposition with Peng that political community arises out of the 
subjective identification of the individual through the practise of politics. Lee thus 
explained the relationship between this concept and his emerging doctrine of locating 
‘sovereignty in the people’ (zhuquan zai min) as follows:  
 
 The establishment of the ideal of sovereignty in the people is to stir up 
every citizen to use his consciousness of being master of his own 
                                                 
23 Complete text in China Post (Taipei), 31 December 1994.  
24    Lee Teng-hui, ‘Towards the 21st Century Arm in Arm -- The Republic of China and the New 
Asian-Pacific Situation’, Creating the Future, pp. 121-27. 
25Lee Teng-hui, ‘From Uncertainty to Pragmatism -- The Shape of the Age to Come’, Creating the 
Future, p 116. 
26 Lee Teng-hui, ‘From Uncertainty to Pragmatism’, p. 117. The term ‘shengming gongtong’ is 
translated in English texts as ‘Gemeinschaft’. Lee does not mention Ferdinand Tonnies, who is usually 
associated with developing the concept for sociology. 
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country (guojia), contributing his wisdom and strength, realizing the 
respect that should be given to a complete individual. And the cohesion 
of a Gemeinschaft, is to mutually integrate the free will of the 
individual with the whole wealth and good of society, to establish a 
civilized society with individual freedom social harmony and 
prosperity.27   
 
That Lee's vision of Gemeinschaft is again quite distinct from any notion of purging 
Taiwan of Chinese influences can he seen in the way that he emphasises the need for 
the state to encourage a pluralistic identity as follows: 
 
 Among the 21 million people in Taiwan, there are aboriginals, and 
there are the compatriots who have come from the mainland over 
several hundred years. Between us, there should be no argument about 
ethnic division. We are all Chinese. Only identify with Taiwan, give 
your heart to preserving and developing Taiwan, no matter what ethnic 
group, no matter whether you came to Taiwan early or late, then all are 
Taiwanese.28 
 
The implications of this vision of identity for policy-making in areas related to culture 
can be seen when the raft of proposals for changes to the school curriculum and 
teaching materials drawn up under the guidance of Tu Cheng-sheng appeared in 1997. 
While the overall effect of this package was to include learning about Taiwan’s own 
geography, history and culture rather than focusing mainly on China, Tu stressed how 
the reforms were not aimed at cleansing Taiwan of Chinese influences but at teaching 
identity in multiple layers that move out from the local community of Taiwan, 
through the national community (guojia) of China and into the pluralistic ‘world 
village’. He explained that this had become possible due to political changes since the 
‘Chinese people in Taiwan’ had acknowledged the existence of the mainland regime 
and were no longer concerned with politics based on Chinese nationalist claims to 
legitimacy. He explicitly denied that this amounted to following fashionable trends of 
developing a ‘Taiwan consciousness’, pointing out that China still had a special place 
in the new curriculum as the second circle of learning, both because it was the key to 
understanding Taiwan’s culture and history and because it posed the biggest threat to 
Taiwan’s security. Moreover, he argued, it would be a shame to waste the academic 
achievements in Chinese studies that Taiwan had built up over the decades.29 
 
Under Lee Teng-hui, therefore, it would be a gross over-simplification to describe the 
movement for nativisation as an attempt to purge Taiwan of Chinese influences. The 
preservation of ethnic and cultural links with China was clearly seen as good for both 
domestic stability and maximising Taiwan’s economic and political advantages. 
                                                 
27    Speech to KMT conference held to examine performance in the elections for provincial governor 
and city mayors. Full text in Zhongguo shibao (China Times), 31 December 1994. 
28 Complete text in Zhongguo shibao (China Times), 31 December 1994. 
29 Tu Cheng-sheng, ‘Bentu-zhongguo-shijie’ (‘Native – China – World)’, Zhongguo shibao (China 
Times)  25 May 1994, p. 11; ‘Lishi jiaoyu yao ruhe songbang’ (‘How to Relax History Education’), 
Lianhe bao (United Daily News),  23 January 1995, p. 11; “Yi ge xin shi guan de dansheng” (‘The 
Birth of a New Idea of History’), Dangdai,  No. 120, 1 August 1997, pp. 20-30. ‘Cong “renshi Taiwan” 
zuotan lishi jiaoyu’ (‘Discusing History Education from “Know Taiwan”’), Dangdai, No: 120, 1 
August 1997, pp. 55-67. 
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Rather than the de-politicisation of ‘China’ being an attempt to exclude a section of 
the population from politics and society, it was supposed to ameliorate the concerns of 
disaffected ‘Mainlanders’ by moving away from the politics of ethnicity. It was also 
supposed to minimise friction with the PRC and present a positive image to the 
liberal-democratic states upon which Taiwan depends for its security.  
 
Within the overall scheme articulated by Lee Teng-hui, the residents of Taiwan were 
encouraged to identify themselves politically with Taiwan's destiny, but were left free 
to build beneficial relationships with other communities if they so wished. As 
unification with China was maintained as the long-term aim of the KMT under the 
Guidelines for National Unification and with the existence of the NUC, the breaking 
of the link between statehood and ethnicity left the choice of developing future 
political formations between Taiwan and China open to the democratic process. 
Overall, the emphasis was on a full democratic participation of all citizens of the 
island, based on a contractarian relationship between individual, society and the state. 
 
Building a cross-party consensus on identity 
Contributing to this emerging consensus on identity politics was not a big problem for 
the DPP, given that its principles were drawn largely from the party’s own intellectual 
heritage. Moderation was also increasingly attractive for a party leadership that was 
aware that the DPP had tended to succeed in elections when it appealed to the 
growing swell of disenchantment over the KMT’s bad governance, rather than 
stressing identity politics. On the relationship with China, there was even a growing 
sense of impatience in society over Lee Teng-hui’s cautious ‘no haste, be patient’ 
policy. This was fuelled by Beijing’s appeal to interest groups in Taiwan, most 
significant being the business community, many of whom were openly calling for 
more flexibility in opening up the Three Contacts.  
 
Beijing’s diplomatic efforts in Central America and Africa were also chipping away at 
the small number of states that formally recognized the ROC. Most important of all 
was the way in which attempts to mend the relationship between Beijing and 
Washington after the 1995-6 Taiwan Strait crisis were beginning to affect domestic 
politics in Taiwan. When a stream of recently retired high-level American officials 
had visited top leaders in Beijing and Taipei they also visited DPP leaders, including 
Chen Shui-bian, who was then mayor of Taipei. The tone of these meetings that was 
conveyed by the media in Taiwan was one of increasingly firm pressure for a 
restarting of cross-strait dialogue, an optimistic assessment of Beijing's sincerity, and 
the importance of maintaining the one-China principle.30 
 
The DPP responded to these pressures under the chairmanships of the two veteran 
Dang Wai members, Shih Ming-teh (Shi Mingde) and Hsu Hsin-liang (Xu Xinliang). 
The first step in this process was to join with the KMT in a National Development 
Conference in December 1996, from which emerged the principle that Taiwan does 
not need to declare independence because it is already an independent state. This is 
the principle that was formalised as DPP policy before Chen Shui-bian came to power 
with the passing of the ‘Resolution Regarding Taiwan’s Future’ in May 1999, which 
has remained at the core of DPP policy-making since.31   
                                                 
30 See reports on Perry's comments to Lee on Jan 17, Free China Journal, 23 February 1998, p. 2. 
31 Online: http://www.dpp.org.tw/ (consulted 10 August 2007). 
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The next step in preparing the DPP for power was Hsu Hsin-liang’s initiative to build 
credibility with the public by convening a DPP conference in full view of the media in 
February 1998. This brought together 36 high-ranking members of the party,32 and its 
findings were submitted to the Central Standing Committee as a reference for drafting 
the DPP’s election strategy. The resulting compromise was encapsulated in the slogan 
‘strong base, westward advance’ (qiang ben, xi jin) that combined the New Tide 
faction’s concern with strengthening Taiwan’s identity and economy, with the 
Formosa faction’s advocacy of the urgent need for greater economic integration with 
China.  
 
The ‘westward advance’ position presented by the Formosa faction centred on the 
argument that growing interdependence across the Taiwan Strait would minimise the 
risks of talking to Beijing and opening up the Three Links, while also helping Taiwan 
to upgrade its own economy by moving out sunset industries. This made good sense 
as a way to counter the image of Taiwan as a regional trouble maker in a post-Cold 
War international order of growing interdependence and the development of a 
‘strategic partnership’ between Washington and Beijing. Rather than Taiwan being 
absorbed into a Greater China, increased transactions in the context of globalization 
would link Taiwan not only with China but also with the leading industrialized states. 
In this context, Taiwan’s Chinese identity would be a positive advantage, because its 
historical, linguistic and cultural links would make it a good base for managing 
international enterprises in China, and even helping China to develop and become 
integrated into the global economy.33 
 
The ‘strong base’ view advocated by the New Tide faction opposed such a view as 
being dangerously naïve in an international system characterised by a neo-realist 
balance of power within which Taiwan would be pressured to hold talks with China. 
National security  would thus best be 34 balanced by better diplomacy and efforts to 
strengthen Taiwan’s economy by improving the island’s investment environment. Of 
most relevance for identity politics, increasing economic integration with China was 
said to pose a serious threat so long as there was little sense of solidarity and much 
indecisiveness over what the national interest was in Taiwan. When outside powers 
had to be dealt with, especially China, civic consciousness might just melt away and 
the status of the nation would become blurred. One of the main tasks for the DPP, 
therefore, was to strengthen Taiwan’s civic consciousness.  
 
Although both the Formosa and New Tide factions were to fall from grace after Chen 
Shui-bian rose to power in the DPP, the ‘strong base, westward advance’ strategy that 
emerged in 1999 represented a consensus within the party that offered continuity with 
the policies and principles that the KMT had developed under Lee Teng-hui. When 
Chen Shui-bian was elected President in 2000, continuity was further strengthened by 
                                                 
32 ‘DPP China Policy Symposium’. Online: http://taiwan.yam.org.tw/china_policy/e_bg.htm (consulted 
10 August 2007). 
33 Hsu Hsin-liang and Chen Chong-hsin, ‘Zai guohi guanxi xin zhixu geju xia chongzhi liang an guanxi 
xin jiyuan’ (‘In the Situation of the New International Order Open Up a New Era in Cross-Strait 
Relations’). Online: http://taiwan.yam.org.tw/china_policy/c_shu-c.htm (consulted 10 August 2008). 
34 Lin Cho-shui (Lin Zhuoshui), ‘Qiangben qian jin de Zhongguo zhengce’ (Strong Base and Gradual 
Advance China Policy). Online: http://taiwan.yam.org.tw/china_policy/l_lin.htm (consulted 10 August 
2008). 
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the way in which many of the architects of the previous policy continued to be 
politically active. Lee Teng-hui, for example, remained highly influential out of 
power, transformed by his most dedicated followers into the spiritual leader of the 
independence movement. Tu Cheng-sheng became head of the National Palace 
Museum and was later appointed Minister of Education.  
 
The continuity of Lee Teng-hui’s balancing act can be seen quite clearly in Chen’s 
2000 and 2004 inauguration speeches. 35 Both of these reiterate Lee’s strategy of 
building constructive relations with China and the US on the one hand, while 
strengthening Taiwan’s nativisation on the other. Chen’s statement in the 2000 speech 
that he did not intend to abolish the National Unificiation Guidelines or the National 
Unification Council emphasised this continuity. His promise not to add include in the 
constitution Lee’s 1999 position that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are two 
separate states enjoying a special relationship, known as his ‘two states doctrine’ 
(liangguo lun) could even be seen as backtracking from his predecessor’s increasingly 
bold position on cross-Strait relations.36  
 
Concerning the relationship between Taiwanese and Chinese identity, however, Chen 
moved the balance decisively towards consolidation of the former. He thus described 
Taiwanese culture as the result of the activities of grassroots organisations working to 
explore and preserve local history, culture, geography and ecology. This clearly 
remained in the context of advocating a pluralistic model of society, however, as he 
warned that cultural development had to be ‘accumulated bit by bit’ through a process 
of tolerance and respect, ‘so that our diverse ethnic groups and different regional 
cultures communicate with each other, and so that Taiwan's local cultures connect 
with the cultures of Chinese-speaking communities and other world cultures, and 
create a new milieu of ‘a cultural Taiwan in a modern century’.37  
 
The implication was clearly that the Chinese cultural presence was welcome, albeit as 
something distinguishable from Taiwan’s native culture and reduced to being on a par 
with ‘world cultures’. Chen’s explanation for the differences in political systems and 
lifestyles on the two sides of the Strait was based on their separate historical 
narratives over the past hundred years, rather than a cultural antipathy. While he 
accepted that ‘The people across the Taiwan Strait share the same ancestral, cultural, 
and historical background’, instead of seeing this as meaning that there is ‘one China’, 
he saw it as being a condition, along with the principles of democracy and parity, that 
would allow the leaders on both sides to ‘possess enough wisdom and creativity to 
jointly deal with the question of a future “one China”’.  
                                                 
35 ‘Taiwan Stands Up: Towards the Dawning of a New Era’. Online at: 
http://www.taipei.org/chen/chen520c.htm (consulted 10 August 2007); ‘Paving the Way for a 
Sustainable Taiwan’, http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/pi2004/ (consulted 10 August 2007). 
36 This was one of Chen’s promises included in his ‘Four Nos’ formula of ‘not announce independence, 
not include Lee Teng-hui’s “two states doctrine” in the constitution, not change the name of the 
country, not change the status quo by having a referendum on independence’. He also added that ‘the 
abolition of the National Reunification Council or the National Unification Guidelines will not be an 
issue’. 
37 The official English translation ‘so that Taiwan's local cultures connect with the cultures of Chinese-
speaking communities and other world cultures’ does not completely reflect the Chinese version, ‘rang 
lizu Taiwan de bentu wenhua yu huaren wenhua, shijie wenhua ziran jiegui’. This would more 
accurately be rendered as ‘Allow the establishment of Taiwan’s native culture to naturally connect with 
the culture of the Chinese people (huaren wenhua) and world culture’. 
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The DPP in power: Between Nativisation and De-sinicisation 
Given the range of options open to Chen between the ‘strong base’ and ‘westward 
advance’ balance that he inherited, several factors can be proposed to explain why 
accusations that he presided over a process of ‘de-sinicisation’ grew after he came to 
power, despite attempts to maintain the inclusive vision of identity inherited from Lee 
Teng-hui and his own party’s traditions.   
 
First of all, attempts to shift state support away from privileging the grand tradition of 
Chinese culture in favour of allowing space for Taiwan's own history, traditions and 
innovations had already provoked criticisms of ‘de-sincisation’ from sections of the 
political elite, media and academia during the Lee Teng-hui era. The event that 
triggered this was the release of plans for the reform of the school curriculum and 
teaching materials that had been drawn up under the guidance of Tu Cheng-sheng, the 
most concrete manifestation of which was the Know Taiwan series of textbooks 
produced by the National Institute of Compilation and Translation (NICT, guoli 
bianyi guan).38 These initiatives were attacked by critics inside Taiwan and mainland 
China for ‘de-sinicisation’, promoting a Taiwanese national identity, lacking 
academic rigour, adopting a Japanese perspective on history that revealed a ‘colonial 
mentality’ on the part of the authors, eroding Taiwan’s links with the Chinese 
mainland and using education to separate the people of Taiwan from Chinese 
consciousness.39 Critics also disliked the way in which the new historical narrative 
was confined to the 400 years that began with the Portuguese naming the island 
‘Formosa’ and ran through a ‘tragic history’ (bei qing de lishi) during which the 
people of Taiwan had not been ‘masters of their home’.40 
 
It is not hard to see how the complaints about the education reforms largely stemmed 
from an attempt to defend ethnic Chinese nationalism. This is clear, for example, in 
anger over the way in which the whole population was no longer referred to as 
‘Chinese’ in the political sense (zhongguo ren) or ethnic sense (hua zu), Instead, the 
textbooks merely stated that some of the population are ‘people of Chinese culture’ 
(zhonghua ren).41 An attempt to defend the historical narrative of Chinese nationalism 
on political grounds can also be seen in the condemnation of the description of 
Japan’s surrender of Taiwan to ROC forces in 1945 as merely ‘the end of the war’ 
instead of the ‘glorious retrocession’ (guang fu). This is even more clear in the way 
that critics were angry that Taiwan was openly referred to as the ‘ROC on Taiwan’, 
something they claimed was inconsistent with the official policy that the ROC is the 
sovereign government of the whole of China, which was only temporarily limited to 
Taiwan.42 In all these respects, those who were angry over the education reforms were 
lagging well behind political and social changes that were taking place under 
democratisation,  
                                                 
38 In August 1997 the National Institute of Compilation and Translation (NICT) produced three 
standard textbooks for “Know Taiwan”: Renshi Taiwan lishi pian (Know Taiwan History Volume), 
Renshi Taiwan shehui pian (Know Taiwan Society Volume), and Renshi Taiwan dili pian (Know 
Taiwan Geography Volume).  
39 Wang Hsiao-po et al, ‘”Renshi Taiwan” lishi pian xiuding’ (‘Corrections to the History Volume of 
“Know Taiwan”’’ in Taiwan shi yanjiu hui (ed.), Renshi Taiwan jiaoke shu (The Know Taiwan 
Textbook),  (Taipei: Taiwan shi yanjiu hui, 1997), pp. 9. 
40 NICT, Renshi Taiwan shehui pian, p. 63. 
41 Renshi Taiwan: shehui pian, pp. 11-14. 
42 Wang Xiaopo et al., ‘”Renshi Taiwan” lishi pian xiuding’, p. 53. 
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The charge that ‘de-sinicisation’ was being used to privilege the position of a new 
political elite and legitimise the concentration of power in the hands of Lee Teng-hui 
was not so easy to refute, however. This can be seen, for example, in the way that the 
new historical narrative of democratisation culminated with the popular election of 
Lee Teng-hui as President in 1996.43 Lee’s influence could also be seen when the 
purpose of the reforms was said to be the consolidation and promotion of a Taiwan 
‘Gemeinschaft’.44 Elements in the text books such as the proclamation in the final 
chapter of the Society volume of the blueprint for ‘creating a “new Taiwan”’ 45 were 
also seen as part of a political programme rather than elements of education 
appropriate for the classroom. All of this added fuel to the charge that “Know 
Taiwan” was more of a political manifesto than a course devised for true education.46  
 
The Chen administration also inherited a political climate within which issues of 
ethnicity had been given a new salience in politics by the overspill of events that 
surrounded the KMT’s traumatic fall from power. The main reason for the party’s 
failure had been the split between the ‘native’ Lee Teng-hui and Lien Chan on the one 
side and the ‘mainlander’ James Soong on the other. Out of this emerged a more 
intense struggle over the nativisation of the KMT and of Taiwan in general. The 
polarisation of identity politics was further institutionalised when Soong established 
the People’s First  Party (PFP), drawing his support largely from disaffected 
‘Mainlanders’ and advocating a pro-unification policy. Inside the KMT, the politics of 
ethnicity continued to simmer.  
 
At the other end of the political spectrum, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) was 
established by those who took on themselves the responsibility for taking forward Lee 
Teng-hui’s policies, claiming Lee as their ‘spiritual leader’ and proclaiming the new 
party’s mission to be scrutinising whether the DPP was truly ‘taking the line of 
Taiwan’s nativisation’.47 It must be said that the TSU was still careful to define 
‘nativisation’ in the inclusive, subjective terms of ‘identifying with Taiwan, 
contribution to Taiwan, and being willing to work for Taiwan’s future’. It even 
maintained the position that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are separated by 
politics but share the same language and culture.48  
 
At the same time, however, the TSU has been able to perform acts that are highly 
controversial and provocative within Chinese political culture, such as the visit to 
Tokyo’s Yasukuni Shrine made by the TSU chairman Su Jinqiang on 5 April 2005. 
This kind of activity not only radicalises identity politics inside Taiwan, it also raises 
the profile of the island as a symbol in the much broader struggle between Chinese 
                                                 
43 NICT, Renshi Taiwan shehui pian, p. 63. 
44 Jiaoyu bu, Guomin zhongxue kecheng, (1994), pp. 854-5. 
45 NICT, Renshi Taiwan shehui pian, p. 90. 
46 This point is made by Wang Chung-fu (Wang Zhongfu) of the Department of History at National 
Taiwan Normal University, among others, in 'Dui yu "renshi Taiwan" jiaoke shu zhi ying you de 
renshi' ('Concerning What Should Be Known About ‘Know Taiwan’'), in Taiwan shi yanjiu hui (ed.), 
Renshi Taiwan jiaoke shu, pp. 6-7. 
47 This is a liberal (but I think accurate) translation of the Chinese ‘jiandu zhizheng dang shi fo zou 
Taiwan zhuti luxian’.  TSU website: 
http://www.tsu.org.tw/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=81&Itemid=28  
48  TSU website: 
http://www.tsu.org.tw/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=17&Itemid=28 
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and Japanese nationalism that was given a new degree of animosity after Junichiro 
Koizumi became Prime Minister of Japan in 2001. Precisely because this is anathema 
to Chinese sentiments, it can also appeal to a core DPP constituency that has never 
accepted that anybody who is associated with China can have a legitimate role to play 
in Taiwanese politics, who have refused to speak Mandarin or even associate with 
dissidents who had their origins in the mainland since the earliest days of the party.49 
This tendency has occasionally emerged in wider social circles too under 
democratisation, as in the spate of violent attacks against mainlanders and their 
property that occurred at the time of the provincial and city mayor elections at the end 
of 1994.50  
 
The emergence of the TSU thus presented a new challenge for a President who had 
only been elected with 39 percent of the vote. Not only did the Chen administration 
have to compete with the TSU to maintain its core base of electoral support, it also 
had to rely on the new party to gain a majority in the Legislative Yuan after it won 13 
seats there in the 2001 election and 12 seats in 2004. In short, Chen was in danger of 
being outflanked on the issue of consolidating Taiwan’s identity. 
 
Some weight also has to be given to the way in which the actions of the PRC have 
shaped the ‘de-sinicisation’ debate. Much attention has been given by observers of 
recent developments to the soft hand of Beijing’s strategy of using the United Front to 
achieve ‘peaceful unification’ under ‘one country, two systems’, namely winning over 
the hearts and minds of key groups in Taiwan through economic and cultural 
transactions. Yet the United Front is also dedicated to isolating and neutralising what 
the CCP deems to be advocates of Taiwanese independence. The increasing 
penetration of this policy inside Taiwan has only tended to politicise the already 
existing tension between ‘Taiwanese’ and ‘Chinese’ as doing business with the 
mainland has been transformed into a question of political loyalty by both sides.  
 
It was probably never feasible to expect anything other than a hostile reaction from 
Beijing to the attempt to build a new consensus over nativisation inside Taiwan. 
Beijing never accepted the attempts to find a compromise formula that began under 
Lee Teng-hui. Accusations that Lee denied that Taiwan is a part of China by locating 
sovereignty in the people51 and that he lacked the ‘sentiments of a Chinese person’ 
(zhongguo ren de ganqing),52 only encouraged demonstrators in Taiwan to assert a 
distinctive ethnicity. When Beijing launched a propaganda barrage against Lee in the 
run-up to the 1996 presidential election, ethnic polarisation became visible as 
                                                 
49    Sun Ch'ing-yu (Sun Qingyu), Min jin dang de xian xiang (The DPP 
Phenomenon), (Taipei, 1992), p.12. Senior opposition activists Lin Cheng-chieh (Lin Zhengjie) and Fei 
Hsi-p’ing (Fei Xiping) were singled out in particular for criticism and were subjected to what Lin  
described as ‘Taiwan-independence fascism’. Zhongyang ribao (Central Daily News) 4 June 1991. 
Both eventually withdrew from the DPP. 
50 The complex nature of the politicisation of identity is made clear from the letters pages of the daily 
newspapers. A telling case is that of the ‘middle class’, ‘floating voter’ woman whose family had been 
in Taiwan for eight generations and whose Hakka grandmother was ejected from a Taxi because she 
spoke Taiwanese with ‘an accent’ she picked up from her mainlander husband. Lianhe bao (United 
Daily News) 2 December 1994. See also the revulsion felt by popular figures from the arts world 
towards the antagonism released by the elections, in the report ‘Yi ren kan xuanju’ (‘Artists Look at the 
Elections’), Lianhe bao 4 December 1994.  
51 Wenhui bao, 16 June 1994. 
52  Wenhui bao, 16 June 1994; Renmin ribao (People's Daily), 16 June 1994. 
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demonstrators took to Taiwan’s streets proclaiming ‘I am Chinese’, while counter-
demonstrators insisted ‘I am Taiwanese’.  
 
The ratcheting up of the CCP’s United Front that has characterised Taiwan policy 
under Hu Jintao’s leadership goes some way to explaining the new salience of the 
argument over ‘de-sinicisation’ that has taken place under the Chen administration. 
Initiatives such as meeting opposition leaders Lien Chan and James Soong and 
targeting the DPP’s core vote by providing economic concessions to Taiwanese 
agricultural exports to the mainland have been accompanied by a tightening of 
restrictions and the imposition of penalties on the activities of supporters of Chen. 
Generous offers have been made to discuss a range of issues, including Taiwan’s 
room for international manoeuvre, so long as ‘one China’ under the so-called ‘1992 
consensus’ is accepted. Those who are categorised as independence activists are 
isolated from this process and are to be resolutely struggled against.  
 
Even when Beijing has tried to adopt a more moderate approach to unification, it 
usually demonstrates a failure to comprehend just how much identity politics has 
shifted since its Taiwan policy was established in the late 1970s. The furthest it has 
managed to go in addressing the nativisation issue in this respect has been Hu Jintao’s 
recognition that it is quite understandable for the islanders to be attached to their 
‘native’ culture’, while explaining that this is the same as people in mainland China 
identifying with their local cultures.53 This equation of Taiwanese identity with that of 
Guangdong or Fujian is only seen as belittling by many in Taiwan as is giving them 
the same status as the former colony of Hong Kong under the ‘one country, two 
systems’ formula. Faced by Beijing’s growing attempts to isolate opponents of 
unification with China, it is not surprising that many in Taiwan respond by 
increasingly putting a distance between ‘native’ Taiwanese identity and Chinese 
identity.  
 
As political actors inside Taiwan respond to this polarisation they are often tempted to 
see the emotions generated by ethnic politics as a political resource. As early as a 
campaign speech of 2 September 1995, Lee Teng-hui could be seen giving in to this 
when he stressed that those who do not want to contribute their strength to Taiwan 
and want to emigrate, should ‘quickly emigrate’.54 By the late 1990s candidates in 
DPP primary elections also began to speak in the Hokkian dialect, effectively 
excluding Mandarin speakers from the democratic process. Many of the key 
initiatives described as a process of ‘de-sinicisation’ under the Chen administration 
have been direct responses to attempts by Beijing to step up its United Front tactics 
and isolate the Taipei government. A clear example of this is the way in which Chen 
announced his doctrine of ‘one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait’ (yi bian yi 
guo) and his intention to implement referendum legislation after Beijing persuaded 
Nauru to break diplomatic relations with Taipei just as he became chairman of the 
DPP in 2002. Similarly, Chen explained his decision to scrap the NUC on 27 
February 2006 as a response to the continued arms build up by the PLA. The way that 
this was used in the domestic context can be seen from the announcement of this 
position the day before the anniversary of the 228 Incident. This allowed Chen to 
                                                 
53 ‘Hu Jintao he Lian Zhan juxing zhengshi huitan jiu fazhang lian an guanxi ti chu si dian zhuzhang’ 
(‘Hu Jintao and Lian Zhan hold formal talks and propose four principles for developing cross-Strait 
relations’), Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), 30 April 2005. 
54 Lianhe bao (United Daily News), 2 September 1995. 
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make an emotional address to a memorial ceremony the next day, during which he 
asked in Mandarin, ‘Is A-bian wrong? Is A-bian wrong by returning the right of 
choosing their future to the 23 million people of Taiwan?’ The rest of his speech was 
in the Hokkien dialect. 
In some respects, then, democratisation can be said to have increased the temptation 
to resort to the politics of ethnicity. This is most evident in election campaigns at all 
levels. James Soong had to spend a disproportionate amount of his time and energy on 
proving his loyalty to Taiwan as he campaigned to be Lien Chan’s vice-president in 
the 2004 presidential election campaign after the DPP focused its fire on his origins in 
mainland China. Even Chen seems to have realised that this was taking politics in a 
dangerous direction, as is evident from the candid admission in his inauguration 
speech that the DPP and he himself needed to undertake a degree of ‘candid self-
reflection’ on the issues of identity and ethnicity. He also reiterated the inclusive 
conception of civic society, this time at somewhat greater length than in his previous 
inauguration speech and even mentioning the need to incorporate ‘immigrant workers 
who labour under Taiwan’s blazing sun’ for the first time into the ‘New Taiwan’ 
family. 
Despite this confirmation of the consensus on an inclusive civic society, however, the 
continuation of the attempt to consolidate Taiwanese identity by remove vestiges of 
the KMT’s Chinese nationalism from public spaces served to perpetuate and deepen 
the argument over ‘de-sinification’ in Chen’s second term. Moreover, the temptation 
to politicise identity politics during even local elections has proven too strong to resist 
even at the local level, as when Chen Shui-bian portrayed the December 2006 election 
for the mayor of Kaohsiung as a struggle between Taiwan and China. A repetition of 
ethnic politics in the presidential election can also be seen in attempts to undermine 
the candidacy of the Hong Kong-born Ma Ying-jeou for the 2008 contest. It is such 
attempts to exclude individuals from legitimate political activity due to their 
‘Chinese’ ethnicity that fuel the broader accusations of ‘de-sinicisation’ in the cultural 
field above all else.  
 
Towards a new consensus 
When assessing responses to identity politics by Taiwan’s political elites, however, it 
would be wrong to propose that there is a clear cut division between parties on the 
choice between ethnic and civic nationalism. As Anthony Smith points out, every 
nationalism does in fact contain both civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and 
different forms. 55  Accusations of ‘de-sinicisation’ levelled against the Chen 
administration tend to obscure initiatives that have had a counter-impact on identity 
politics. The influence of the continuation of the incremental but steady liberalisation 
of transactions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait that began in the 1980s, for 
example, can be in phenomena such as the huge numbers of Taiwanese travelling to 
mainland China for work and recreation and the growing number of mainland spouses 
in Taiwan. In the cultural field it is also evident in the penetration of the island’s 
publishing market, with a proliferation of bookshops selling mainland Chinese works 
now threatening the native industry. Rather then try to stop such tendencies, the Chen 
administration continued to search for an optimal balance not only through 
strengthening Taiwan’s civic consciousness as the base but also through initiatives 
                                                 
55 Smith, National Identity,  p. 13. 
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such as widening the study of English language in order to facilitate Taiwan’s role in 
the processes of globalisation. 
 
On the other side of the political divide, ethnic politics has continued to characterise 
power struggles inside the KMT. This came to a boiling point when the popular 
mayor of Taipei, Hong Kong-born Ma Ying-jeou, competed with the Taiwanese-born 
parliamentary speaker Wang Jyng-pin in the contest to elect a new party chairman 
who would be candidate for the 2008 presidential election. Part of Wang’s campaign 
involved claiming that many people thought it was not right for an ethnic minority to 
rule over the majority in Taiwan.  More optimistically, however, the continuing 
attractiveness of the cross-party consensus on an inclusive sense of identity that was 
developed under the Lee Teng-hui administration can be seen in the way that the Pan-
Blue camp has contributed to the exploration and articulation of the discourse on 
‘nativisation’.  
 
Nowhere is this clearer than in the monograph Original Native Spirit: the model story 
of Taiwan, 56 published by Ma Ying-jeou in June 2007 to mark out his position on 
identity politics in time for the March 2008 presidential election. Ma’s book is an 
important contribution to the argument over ‘de-sinicisation because it presents an 
extensive re-interpretation of ‘nativisation’ by emphasising the positive contributions 
made by China to Taiwan’s economic and political development. He thus challenges 
the narrative of the ‘400 years of tragedy’ under foreign occupation that is promoted 
by the pro-independence movement by describing the achievements of figures from 
China from the reforming Qing Dynasty governor Liu Mingchuan, through key 
political actors in the Republican period, such as the philosopher and cultural 
commentator Hu Shi, the early critic of the KMT dictatorship in Taiwan, Lei Chen 
(Lei Zhen), and Chiang Kaishek’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo. He also tackles the 
existence of a distinctive Taiwanese consciousness before 1945 by pointing out that 
many natives of the island joined the Chinese in the resistance against Japan, both in 
Taiwan and the mainland. He also disputes the accusation that the Taiwanese were not 
consulted about their future status after World War Two by observing that the island 
sent delegates to take part in the National People’s Congress in Nanjing when it drew 
up and promulgated the 1947 ROC Constitution. He even undermines the privileged 
ethnic position bestowed on figures such as Chen Shui-bian by reminding readers that 
his ancestors were colonisers from mainland China too.  
 
It is important to stress, however, that Ma is not trying to revive the KMT’s old 
version of an ethnocentric kind of Chinese nationalism that can be used to suspend 
democracy until unification is achieved. Instead, his deconstruction of nativisation is 
firmly committed to reinforcing democratic principles. He differs from the DPP, 
however, in emphasising that Taiwan’s democratisation has to be seen as part of a 
broader process that inevitably involves mainland China. This argument is partly 
pragmatic, proposing that Taiwan is dependent economically on the mainland market 
and that democratisation in China is therefore the best way to ensure Taiwan’s future 
security. Yet it is also idealistic, insofar as Ma draws attention to the potential for 
Taiwan to be a beacon for political transformation on the other side of the Strait, 
drawing encouragement from the modernising spirit of the May 4 movement that 
began in the mainland in 1919 and the democracy movement that was crushed in 1989.  
                                                 
56 Ma Ying-jeou, Yuanxiang jingshen: Taiwan de dianfan gushi, Taipei, tianxia yuanjian chuban. 
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Ma’s commitment to unification with China under the umbrella of future 
democratisation has thus moved a long way from the ideology of a party that once 
imprisoned people for speaking non-Mandarin dialects and actually censored the 
works of many of the Taiwanese intellectuals that he praises for having resisted 
Japan.57 This is made clear from the lengthy exploration of nativisation that appears in 
the introduction to his book, written by Yang Tu (Yang Du), a senior journalist at the 
Chinese-language China Times newpaper.58 Yang challenges the attempt to build an 
exclusive Taiwanese identity based on the ethnic characteristics of the majority of the 
population who came from Fujian province in mainland China before 1949 by 
stressing the diversity of a society that has been formed by seven waves of 
immigration and that is now being shaped by the forces of globalization. In this 
context, he argues that the only people really entitled to call themselves ‘native’ are 
the tiny number of aboriginal peoples who have survived this colonization, and that 
‘nativisation is inclusiveness, it is the integration of immigrant culture, it is a process 
of constant addition, constant rejection and constant renewal’.59 
 
This commitment to the development of an inclusive civic culture might well be 
understood as arising from the fears of exclusion from political life on ethnic grounds 
faced by a figure like Ma. Moreover, the positive views of Taiwan as a pluralistic, 
multi-cultural, immigrant society can actually be found in a DPP document such as 
Chen Shui-bian’s 2004 inauguration speech. Having said this, any critique of the 
dangers of exclusive ethnic politics should be considered a welcome contribution to 
the development of democracy and a warning to political actors tempted by populist 
politics to depart from the consensus on inclusiveness. When Ma and Yang reveal the 
fallacy of a DPP that is dominated by descendants of immigrants from China 
attempting to purge Taiwan of Chinese influences, they are thus consolidating the 
consensus on the need to build an inclusive form of civic nationalism that goes back 
to the days of the Dang Wai. After all, as Yang points out, real ‘de-sinicisation’ would 
mean changing the name of the island itself, because the origins of ‘Taiwan’ can be 
traced to the Hokkien dialect of China’s Fujian province. To be consistent, given that 
people like Chen Shuibian are descendants of Han mainlanders, they should purge the 
island of themselves! 
 
Maintaining a culture fit for civic nationalism 
It has been argued above that calling all changes made to the old symbols of KMT-era 
authoritarianism ‘de-sinicisation’ amounts to a caricature of the complex negotiation 
of identity politics that has to take place under Taiwan’s democratisation. While many 
people have angrily reacted to the idea of renaming the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial 
Hall in central Taipei as ‘Taiwan Democracy Hall’, for example, this is quite different 
from renaming it ‘CSB Hall’. The proposal to pull down the traditional-style Chinese 
walls that surround this monument might well jar on one’s aesthetic sensibilities, but 
                                                 
57 This point about how the KMT used to treat Taiwanese intellectuals lauded by Ma for having 
resisted Japan is made with reference to the debate over Lai He (1894-1943), the 'Father of Taiwanese 
literature, who was listed as 'dangerous' by the KMT in 1958 due to his left leaning political views', in 
Hsu Wei-te (Xu Weide) 'Jiedu Lai He guozu rentong suo sheji de jidian zhengyi' ('Interpreting Some 
Points of Contention that Touch on Lai He's National Identity'), Gonghe (The Republic), 2007:55 
(June), pp . 6-13.  
58 Yang Tu (Yang Du), 'Xin Taiwan ren, xiang qian xing' ('New Taiwanese, Moving Forward'), in Ma, 
pp. 1-38. 
59 Yang, p. 27. 
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more is required to show that this is a deliberate policy to purge Taiwan of Chinese 
influences rather than just a tasteless project to create a more accessible public space.  
 
The potential of the state to manipulate national identity should also not be 
exaggerated. As of writing, signposts in Taiwan remain a confusing mixture of 
various types of Romanisation. That the government position on nativist education 
recognises the complex ethnic composition of Taiwanese society and the special role 
played by Han culture has been spelt out on numerous occasions by a figure like Tu 
Cheng-sheng.60 Yet this did not shield him from the wrath of the TSU in the summer 
of 2007, when 67 percent of the content of the National Literature (guo wen) 
university entrance exam was concerned with classical Chinese literature. The very 
fact that the TSU was not satisfied by Tu’s explanation, in his capacity as Minister of 
Education, that he had deliberately commissioned the independent Examination 
Centre to deal with such sensitive issues,61 shows just how difficult it is for the state 
to get identity politics right. Even if the state does accelerate the building of a new 
Taiwanese identity with a vengeance, the failure of the KMT to instil a sense of 
Chinese national identity in Taiwan when it did not have to worry about the 
complications of democratic politics may well be the best precedent for showing why 
the prospects for the success of such a project are limited. 
Rather than concluding that an erosion of democracy is occurring due to de-
sinicisation, therefore, it has been proposed that a consensus has in fact emerged 
between the main political parties on the need to develop a politics of identity that is 
based on an inclusive, participatory form of civic culture. This has its origins in a 
democracy movement that realised how destabilising it would be to replace Chinese 
nationalism with an exclusive form of Taiwanese nationalism based on ethnicity. 
Yet it has also been suggested that the civic culture paradigm is rather limited when it 
comes to dealing with the way in which identity is negotiated in Taiwan. This is 
because it is not directly concerned with the questions of national identity that are 
forced on the island by its relationship with China. Almond and Verba, for example, 
are concerned with exploring the ‘balance among the parochial, subject and 
participant roles’,62 which can take place in a wide variety of states, some of which 
are highly decentralised. Puttnam’s work is an exploration of Italian regional 
democracy. 63   In principle, therefore, the proposition that Taiwan should a 
participatory civic culture that draws its values from native traditions might be 
compatible with it being part of a greater entity called ‘China’, just as Tuscany is part 
of Italy. While this might fit the model of ‘one country, two systems’ advocated by 
Beijing, it would not do justice to the way in which the arguments over nativisation 
                                                 
60 On Tu's theory of education see Hughes and Stone, ‘Curriculum Reform in Hong Kong and Taiwan’. 
For a more recent personal exposition of Tu’s views see his speech 'Taiwan's Educational Reform and 
the Future of Taiwan' delivered on 10 January 2007 at the London School of Economics and Political 
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August 2007). 
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('High Proportion of Classical Chinese in Exam  TSU: University Exam Centre Director Should Stand 
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62 Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, p. 440. 
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and ‘de-sinicisation’ in Taiwan unavoidably involve the issue of how to consolidate 
the island’s sovereign independence and have it recognised as such by international 
society. 
 
Taiwan’s identity politics thus has to be understood as shaped by the wider 
transformations of identities in Northeast Asia, too. Serious repercussions are 
generated in this region whenever attempts are made to address the legacies of the 
Chinese and Japanese versions of nationalism that moulded the island’s identity in the 
past. In particular, it has not been possible to present the nativisation project in a way 
that is acceptable to a Chinese government and Communist Party that still bases its 
unification policy on the politics of ethnic nationalism, from the appeal to the 
‘descendants of the Yellow Emperor’ that is made in the Letter to Taiwan 
Compatriots sent by the National People’s Congress in 1979, down to Hu Jintao’s 
insistence that solving the Taiwan problem and realising unification of the 
‘motherland’ (zu guo) is ‘the shared desire of Chinese sons and daughters at home and 
abroad’.64  
 
In this respect, it is useful to draw on the distinction between ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ 
nationalism to explain the arguments over ‘de-sinicisation’ and ‘nativisation’. Taiwan 
is certainly faced by the possibility of a contest between harshly opposed Chinese and 
Taiwanese versions of ethnic nationalism that would divide wreak both internal and 
external havoc. The discourse of nativisation, however, presents a third possibility. 
This is closer to the kind of civic nationalism that has emerged as the foundation of 
the Western liberal-democratic state. In principle, this is participatory and inclusive, 
because it is based more on legal and territorial definitions and subjective loyalty than 
it is on pre-determined culture, blood-line or origins.  
Despite the heated rhetoric generated by the argument over ‘de-sinicisation’, 
encouragement should be drawn from the way in which democratisation has so far 
constrained ‘nativisation’ within the participatory framework of civic nationalism. If 
the literature on ‘civic culture’ is to be useful in explaining this kind of development, 
it should be through reminding us how the type of democratic culture that developed 
as the foundation for the liberal-democratic Western state is ‘neither traditional nor 
modern but partaking of both; a pluralistic culture based on communication and 
persuasion, a culture of consensus and diversity, a culture that permitted change but 
moderated it.’65  
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